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INTRODUCTION 
The STS-50 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report contains a summary of the 
; Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster/Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor 
(SRBIRSRM) , and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) subsys tem performance 
. during the forty-eighth flight of the Space Shuttle Program, and the twelfth 
flight of the Orbiter vehicle Columbia (OV-102). In addition to the Columbia 
: vehicle, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET which was designated ET-50 
: (LWT-43); three SSMEts which were serial numbers 2019, 2031, and 2011 in 
positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRBfs which were designated BI-051. 
The lightweight/redesigned RSRMts installed in each SRB were designated 360L024A 
for the left RSRM and 360M024B for the right RSRM. 
---. 
The STS-50 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle 
Program requirement, as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E, which 
states that each major organizational element supporting the Program will report 
the results of its hardware evaluation and mission performance plus identify all 
related in-flight anomalies. 
-. 
The primary objective of the STS-50 flight was to successfully perform the 
planned operations of the United States Microgravity Laboratory (USML-1) 
i payload. The secondary objectives of this flight were to perform the operations 
i required by the Investigations into Polymer Membrane Processing (IPMP), and the 
i Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment I1 (SAREX-11) payloads. An additional 
secondary objective was to meet the requirements of the Ultraviolet Plume 
. '  Instrument (WPI), which was flown as a payload of opportunity. 
STS-50 was the first flight of OV-102 after completion of the Orbiter 
Maintenance Down Period (OMDP), which was completed at Palmdale, CA. In 
addition, STS-50 was the first flight in the Space Shuttle Program of the 
following: 
a. Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) cryogenics pallet; and 
b. Regenerative carbon dioxide removal system. 
The sequence of events for the STS-SO mission is shown in Table I and the 
Official Orbiter and GFE Projects Problem Tracking List is shown in Table 11. 
The STS-50 mission was planned as a 13-day mission; however, because of 
unsatisfactory weather at the primary landing site (Edwards Air Force Base) the 
landing was delayed one day. Unsatisfactory weather was still present at the 
primary landing site and the decision was made to land at Kennedy Space Center 
on the first extension day of the mission. 
/ 
,'The report also discusses each Orbiter, ET, SSME, and SRB/RSRM subsystem anomaly - 
in the applicable section of the report, and a reference to the assigned 
: tracking number is provided when the anomaly is mentioned in the body of the 
. report. All times in the text are given in both Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) 
' and mission elapsed time (MET). 
The crew for this forty-eighth Space Shuttle flight was Richard N. Richards, 
Capt. USN, Commander; Kenneth D. Bowersox, Lt. Cdr. USN, Pilot; Bonnie J. 
Dunbar, Ph.D., Civilian, Mission Specialist 1 (Payload Commander); Ellen S. 
Baker, M.D., Civilian, Mission Specialist 2; Carl J. Meade, Col. USAF, Mission 
- 
Specialist 3; Eugene H. Trinh, Ph.D., Civilian, Payload Specialist 1; and a 
Lawrence J. Delucas, Ph.D., Civilian, Payload Specialist 2. STS-50 was the 
third space flight for the Commander and Mission Specialist 1, the second space 
flight for Mission Specialists 2 and 3, and the first space flight for the Pilot # 
and both Payload Specialists. 
MISSION SUMMARY 
Lift-off of the STS-50 vehicle from launch complex 39A occurred at 
177:16:12:22.997 G.m.t. (12:12:23 p.m. e.d.t.) on June 25, 1992, after a 
5-minute 23-second hold at T-9 minutes because of unacceptable weather in the 
launch-site area. A decision was made to count down to T-5 minutes and hold for 
acceptable weather; however, while the count was proceeding at approximately 
T-7 minutes, the weather was declared acceptable for launch and the countdown 
was continued to lift-off without an additional hold. The orbital inclination 
was 28.45 degrees. The total vehicle weight at lift-off was 4,519,430 lb, and 
the Orbiter weight at lift-off was 257,339 lb. 
During the T-9 minute hold, the inertial measurement unit (IMU) 3 gyro drift 
rate exceeded the specification of 0.09 deg/hr by 0.0011 deg/hr during an 
inertial reference alignment measurement system (IRAMS) filter pass. After the 
next filter pass, the drift rate was within specification. Since the data were 
acceptable during the subsequent filter passes, no Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) 
violations were noted, and the countdown was not held for this problem. 
The launch phase was satisfactory in all respects. All SSME and RSRM start 
sequences occurred as expected and the launch phase performance was satisfactory 
in all respects. First stage ascent performance was normal with SRB separation, 
entry, deceleration, and water impact occurring as anticipated. Both SRB's were 
successfully recovered. Performance of the SSMEts, ET, and main propulsion 
system (MPS) was also normal with main engine cutoff (MECO) occurring 
approximately 507.2 seconds after lift-off. 
The right orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) yaw actuator moved approximately 
0.24 degree during ascent. The movement began at lift-off and ended shortly 
after the period of maximum dynamic pressure (max Q). The 0.24-degree movement 
indicated slippage of the actuator "no-back" device. The Operations and 
Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD) File IX limit is 
0.20 degree; however, 0.24-degree movemen t was not a concern for entry . 
Redundancy management monitors actuator movement and drives the engine back to 
the stowed position if the movement exceeds 0.7 degree. This precludes the 
engine nozzle from entering the air stream where enginehozzle damage could 
result. On-orbit OMS firing and entry data indicated the no-back device 
operated properly. 
No OMS 1 maneuver was required, and the OMS 2 maneuver was performed at 
177:16:52:13.7 G.m.t. (00:39:51 MET). The firing time for the OMS 2 maneuver 
was 141.6 seconds with a resultant differential velocity ( A V )  of 222.0 ftlsec. 
The Orbiter was in a 160-nmi. circular orbit at the completion of the OMS-2 
maneuver. 
1 
The payload bay door opening sequence was initiated at 177:17:37:38 G.m.t. 
(00:01:25:15 MET) and the doors were fully open approximately three minutes 
. later. The Ku-band antenna was satisfactorily deployed at 177:17:46 G.m.t. 
(00:01:34 MET). 
The Spacelab facility was activated at 177:20:42 G.m. t. (00:04: 30 MET), about 
10 minutes ahead of schedule. 
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem oxygen tank 2 
pressure indicated a decrease at the rate equivalent to approximately 1 lblhr. 
Leakage from this tank did not impact mission duration or entry as the tank 2 
management plan called for 125 lb of oxygen to be used from this tank early in 
the mission to ensure that the 13-day plus 2-day contingency capability was 
preserved in the remaining PRSD tanks. 
The Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) pallet tanks began supplying hydrogen and 
oxygen about 24 hours into the flight, and satisfactorily met all requirements 
throughout the mission. This was the first flight of the ED0 pallet in the 
Space Shuttle Program. 
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) thruster L1U heater was declared failed on 
at 177:23:42 G.m.t. (00:07:30 MET). The crew turned off the heater when it was 
declared failed. Five other thrusters were also affected by turning off heater 
power (RlU, RlR, RIA, LlL, and LlA). The crew managed the thruster heaters 
manually to maintain temperatures within the 60° F to 160' F range for all 
thrusters. This was the same plan that was used on STS-49 to manage a similar 
failure. Later in the mission (approximately flight day 2), a subsequent 
failure within the heater controller limited the power to the L1U heater. As a 
result of this second failure, the temperature of the thruster 'was maintained at 
approximately 135O F for the remainder of the mission with no further manual 
cycles required. 
STS-50 was the first flight of the regenerable C02 removal subsystem (RCRS). 
The RCRS was activated shortly after orbital insertion and operated 
satisfactorily for the first 25 hours of the mission. The RCRS uses regenerable 
solid amine to adsorb C02 and water from the Orbiter cabin environment instead 
of non-regenerable lithium hydroxide (LiOH). 
Beginning at 178:20:26 G.m.t. (01:04:14 MET), the RCRS experienced a total of 
six shutdowns, and the RCRS was deactivated about two hours later at 
01:06:06 MET and fresh LiOH canisters were installed in the Spacelab and in the 
Orbiter. 
C 
An in-flight maintenance (IFM) procedure was developed for regaining 
single-string operation of the RCRS. Development included duplicating the 
failure condition in the Environmental Test Article (ETA) facility, performing 
the IFM procedure, and verifying the RCRS operation by a two-hour verification 
run. The procedure was initiated onboard the Orbiter beginning at approximately 
182:12:12 G.m.t. (04:20:00 MET). The procedure required about 4 hours and 
45 minutes to complete af ter which the RCRS was powered up at 182:16:57 G.m. t. 
(05:00:45 MET), after which it operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the 
mission. 
The oxygen purge valve on fuel cell 3 failed to close after completion of the 
eighth purge at approximately 181:11:43 G.m.t. (03:19:31 MET). The valve I 
subsequently reseated after being manually cycled open and then closed by the 
crew. As a result, a decision was made to not purge fuel cell 3 for the rest of 
the mission unless excessive degradation of the electrici ty-producing capability 
occurred. Fuel cell 3 performance degradation was less than 0.4 volt during the 
remainder of the mission, and no additional purges of fuel cell 3 were required 
after the problem occurred. 
The Orbiter was maneuvered into a bottom-solar-inertia1 attitude a number of 
times during the mission for thermal conditioning of the tires. The main 
landing gear (MLG) tire temperatures were maintained at sat is£ ac tory levels 
throughout the mission. Prior to entry, the lowest tire pressure indicated was 
349 psia, well above the 337 psia lower limit. 
On flight day 8, the crew removed the tunnel duct cap, which is redundant to the 
payload isolation valve and allows better air circulation between the Spacelab 
and the crew module. The partial pressure of C02 in the Spacelab dropped from 
approximately 6.7 mmHg to 6.2 mmHg within two hours of the cap removal, and the 
CO level in the crew cabin experienced a corresponding rise from approximately 
4.3 mmHg to 5.0 mmHg. This cap should have been removed during Spacelab 
activation; however, the crew was not aware of this requirement as there were no 
written procedures that required the cap to be removed. 
Data from a series of six recharges of the hydraulic system 2 accumulator 
, 
indicated a leak of gaseous nitrogen (GN ) from the system 2 bootstrap 
accumulator. The first four recharges szowed nominal GN2 pressures of 
approximately 2500 psi. However, the fifth recharge at approximately 
188:15:44 G.m.t. (10:23:32 MET) and the sixth recharge 7 hours 15 minutes later 
showed pressures of 2356 and 2127 psi, respectively. Continuous manual 
operation of the circulation pump began at 189:06:03 G.m.t. (11:13:51 MET) after 
the recharge was initiated under general purpose computer (GPC) control. The 
concern was that loss of GN2 pressure could result in loss of head pressure to 
the main hydraulic pump. Main pump start with loss of reservoir/bootstrap 
pressure is uncertified. Head pressure was maintained with manual circulation 
pump 2 operation. 
The flight control system (FCS) checkout was performed at 189:12:02:02.25 G.m.t. 
(11:19:49:39.25 MET) using auxiliary power unit (APU) 3. APU 3 ran for 
7 minutes 9 seconds and all subsystems performed satisfactorily. 
The RCS hot-fire test was conducted at 190:07:50 G.m.t. (12:15:38 MET). During -0 
the hot fire test, thruster F2F failed off because of low chamber pressure. 
The failure occurred on the first pulse of the thruster at 
190:07:50:42.38 G.m.t. (012:15:38:19.39 MET). Chamber pressure reached only .. 
5 psi during the firing, and injector temperatures indicated that propellant 
initially flowed through both valves to the combustion chamber. 
Because of the unsatisfactory weather conditions at Edwards Air Force Base, the 
preflight-planned landing opportunity and the next revolution landing 
opportunity were not acceptable. The landing was postponed approximately 24 
hours and planned for Edwards Air Force Base or Kennedy Space Center on July 9, 
1992. The weather remained unsatisfactory at Edwards Air Force Base and the 
decision was made to land at Kennedy Space Center on the first daylight 
opportunity. 
After the decision was made to delay the landing for 24 hours, an OMS-3 
orbi t-adjus t maneuver was performed at 190: 15: 09: 22 G.m. t . (12: 22:56:59 MET) to 
better align the orbit for the planned landing opportunities on the following 
days. The dual engine maneuver was 30.8 seconds in duration and the AV was 
49.6 ft/sec. 
Both payload bay (PLB) doors were closed by 191:08:04:29 Gem. t. 
(13:15:52:06 MET). At 191:07:52 G.m.t. (13:15:40 MET) during the PLB door 
closure operat ions, the starboard forward payload bay door floodlight failed. 
The loss of the floodlight did not affect mission operations. 
The deorbit maneuver was performed at .191:10:41:38.0 G.m.t. (13:18:29:48 MET). 
The maneuver was approximately 203.9 seconds in duration and the AV was 
341.9 ft/sec. Entry interface occurred at 191:11:10:46 G.m.t. 
(13:18:58:23 MET). 
During entry while performing the programmed test inputs (PTIts) for development 
test objective 251 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test, the aileron roll 
trim began to diverge, eventually reaching 1.7 degrees with spikes as high as 
2.2 degrees at Mach 8. The flight rule trim limit is 1.5 degrees, consequently, 
the PTIts were terminated. No vehicle control or stability problems were 
encountered as a result of this divergence. 
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at Kennedy Space Center, FL, on concrete 
runway 33 at 191:11:42:27-G.m.t. (13:19:30:04 MET) on July 9, 1992. Nose 
landing gear touchdown occurred 18 seconds later with wheels stop at 
191:11:43:25 G.m.t. (13:19:31:02 MET). The rollout was normal in all respects. 
The drag chute was deployed immediately following nose gear touchdown and was 
jettisoned at 191:11:43:10.7 G.m.t. (13:19:30:47.1 MET). The flight duration 
was 13 days 19 hours 30 minutes 04 seconds. Because of an abnormal 
repressurization of the APU 1 gearbox, the APU was shut down about 4 minutes 
after landing. The Orbiter weight at landing was 225,615 lb. 
A hydraulic load test was performed on APUts 2 and 3 after which the two APUts 
were shut down by 191:12:01:03 G.m.t. The crew completed the required 
postflight reconfigurations and departed the Orbiter landing area at 
191:13:08:30 G.m.t. (09:08:30 a.m. e.d.t. on July 9, 1992). 
Fourteen of the 16 planned development test objectives (DTOts) were completed, 
and all 17 detailed supplementary objectives (DSOts) were accomplished. 
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE 
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER/REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTOR 
All SRB systems performed as expected. The SRB prelaunch countdown was normal, 
and no SRB in-flight anomalies were identified. No SRB or RSRM LCC or OMRSD 
violations occurred. 
Power-up and operation of all case, igniter, and field joint heaters were 
accomplished routinely . All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable 
limits throughout the countdown. For this flight, the heated ground purge in 
the SRB aft skirt was powered up and maintained the case/nozzle joint and 
flexible bearing temperatures within the required LCC ranges. 
The RSRM propulsion performance was well within the specification limits, and 
the propellant burn rate for each RSRM was normal. RSRM thrust differentials 
during the buildup, s teady-s tate, and tailof f phases were well within 
specification, and were typical of the performance observed on previous flights. 
Key RSRM propulsion performance parameters are presented in the table on the 
following page. 
The SRB flight structural temperature response was as expected. Postflight 
inspection of the recovered hardware indicated that the SRB thermal protection 
system (TPS) performed properly during ascent with very little TPS acreage 
ablation; however, one RSRM in-flight anomaly was identified during postflight 
inspection of the TPS on the left RSRM forward-center segment. Three areas of 
cork were missing on the aft ground environment instrumentation (GEI) cork run 
(station 1099) at the 180-, 186-, and 192-degree locations (Flight Problem 
STS-50-M-1). The investigation has determined that the missing cork was 
associated with a processing problem that occurred only on this segment when a 
vacuum bag leak caused a delay in the installation of the cork beyond the pot 
life of the adhesive, resulting in several small unbonded areas. This conditinn 
did not present a safety-of-flight issue for STS-50 because the areas of concern 
were on the side of the RSRM away from the Orbiter. 
Both SRBts were successfully separated from the ET at 126.3 seconds after 
lift-off. Separation subsystem performance was normal with all booster 
separation motors (BSMts) expended and all separation bolts severed. Nose cap 
jet tison, f rus tum separation, and nozzle jet tison occurred normally on each SRB. 
The entry and deceleration sequence was properly performed on both SRBts. RSRM 
nozzle jettison occurred after frustum separation, and subsequent parachute 
deployments were successfully performed. Both SRBts were recovered and returned 
to Cape Canaveral by the retrieval ships. The SRBts have been disassembled and 
are being refurbished for future use. 
EXTERNAL TANK . 
All objectives and requirements associated with the ET propellant loading and 
flight operations were met. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation 
performed satisfactorily throughout the countdown and flight. ET purge and 
heater operations were monitored and all performed properly. Propellant loading 
was completed as scheduled and all prelaunch thermal requirements were met. No 
LCC or OMRSD violations were identified. ET flight performance was excellent. 
6 
RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE 
As expected, only the normal ice/frost formations for the June atmospheric 
environment were observed during the countdown. There was no frost or ice on 
the acreage areas of the ET. Normal quantities of ice or frost were present on 
the liquid oxygen (LO2) and liquid hydrogen (LH ) feedlines and on the Z pressurization line brackets. A small amount o frost was also present along 
the edge of the LH protuberance air load (PAL) ramps. All of the observations 
were acceptable an% in accordance with NASA documentation. The IcelFros t "Red 
Teamn reported that there were no anomalous TPS conditions; however, a crack in 
the TPS foam at the junction of the vertical strut cable tray and fairing at the 
.. 
base of the strut was identified and determined to be acceptable. No ice or 
frost line was present at the crack. 
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and 
flight. The minimum LO2 ullage pressure experienced during the period of the 
a ullage pressure slump was 14.6 psid. 
Parameter 
Impulse gakes 
1-20, lo6 lbf-sec 
1-60, lo6 lbf-sec 
I-AT, 10 lbf-sec 
Vacuum Isp, lbf-sec/lbm 
Burn rate, in/sec @ 60 OF 
at 625 psia 
Event times, seconds 
Ignition interval 
Web time 
Action time 
Separation cue, 50 psia 
PMBT, OF 
Maximum ignition rise rate, 
psia/lO ms 
Decay time, seconds 
(59.4 psia to 85 K) 
Tailoff imbalance 
Impulse differential, 
klbf-sec 
Right motor, 
Predicted 
64.95 
173.38 
296.67 
268.6 
0.3645 
0.232 
110.8 
120.7 
122.8 
78.0 
90.4 
2.8 
78' F 
Actual 
64.88 
173.73 
296.60 
268.5 
0.3649 
N/ A 
110.8 
120.4 
122.8 
78.0 
N/ A 
3.1 
Left motor, 
Predicted 
65.27 
174.15 
296.79 
268.6 
0.3655 
0.232 
110.3 
120.1 
122.2 
78.0 
90.4 
2.8 
Actual 
888.4 
78' F 
Actual 
64.67 
173.36 
296.63 
268.5 
0.3638 
N/ A 
110.8 
121.2 
123.7 
78.0 
N/A 
3.4 
Predicted 
N/A 
ET separation was confirmed to have occurred properly, and the ET entry and 
breakup were determined to have occurred within the predicted footprint. 
The ET tumble system was deactivated for this flight, and radar reports from 
Bermuda confirmed that the ET did not tumble. There were no significant ET 
problems identified ; however, one ET in-flight anomaly was identified during 
postflight activities. Review of the ET umbilical film and photographs taken by 
the crew showed two areas of TPS damage on the forward bipod (Flight Problem 
STS-50-T-1). Approximately one-half of the insulation that was formed around 
the bipod ramp was missing, and the jackpad closeout located immediately below 
the right bipod strut was also missing. 
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE 
All SSME parameters appeared to be normal throughout the prelaunch countdown and 
were typical of prelaunch parameters observed on previous flights. The engine 
"ready" condition was achieved at the proper time, all LCC were met, and engine 
start and thrust buildup were normal. 
Flight data indicate that SSME performance during mainstage, throttling, 
shutdown, and propellant-dump operations were normal. High pressure oxidizer 
turbopump (HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures appeared 
to be well within specification throughout engine operation. 
The SSME controllers provided the proper control of the engines throughout 
powered flight. Engine dynamic data generally compared well with previous 
flight and test data. All SSME on-orbit activities were accomplished 
successfully. No significant SSME problems were identified; however, an 
in-flight anomaly was identified during the postflight data review. SSME 3 
(serial no. 2011) data showed a HPFTP pressure spike (-10,600 psia) at engine 
start +219.46 seconds and immediately recovered at engine start +219.54 seconds. 
(Flight Problem STS-50-E-1). Although this particular sensor was used for 
"maintenance onlym indication, concern exists because this same type sensor is 
also used as an input to the engine controller in other applications. The 
sensor was returned to the vendor and dissected, and a small metallic sliver and 
a solder bead were found. These contaminants most likely caused the anomalous 
indication. 
An evaluation of SRB/SSME ascent performance was made using vehicle acceleration 
and preflight propulsion data. From these data, the average flight-derived SSME 
specific impulse (Isp) determined for the time period between SRB separation and 
start of 3g throttling was 452.4 seconds as compared to a fleet average tag 
value of 452.42 seconds. 
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM 
The Shuttle range safety system (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as . 
scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were 
armed and system inhibits turned off at the appropriate times. All SRSS 
measurements indicated that the system performance was as expected throughout 
the launch phase. 
Prior to SRB separation, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and SRB system power 
was turned off, as planned. The ET system remained active until ET separation 
from the Orbiter. The SRSS on the ET was modified for this flight and 
subsequent flights by removing the linear-shaped charge from the liquid hydrogen 
tank. The system signal strength remained well within system requirements 
throughout the ascent phase. 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS PERFORMANCE 
Main ' Pro~ulsion Svs tem 
The overall performance of the MPS was excellent. The pressurization systems 
performed as predicted. Evaluation of flow control valve data revealed nominal 
operation of these valves. 
All pretanking purges were properly performed, and liquid oxygen and liquid 
hydrogen loading was completed as planned with no stop-flows or reverts. 
Calculated propellant loads were very close to the inventory loads. The MPS 
helium system performed satisfactorily with a total of 55.9 lbm of helium used 
during the mission. No OMRSD or LCC violations were identified. 
Throughout preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas concentrations 
were detected, and the maximum corrected hydrogen level in the Orbiter aft 
compartment was 125 ppm. The level is well within the historical limits of this 
vehicle. The aft compartment helium concentration peaked at 9600 ppm, and the 
maximum aft compartment oxygen concentration was 60 ppm. 
The gaseous oxygen pressurization system performed normally throughout the 
flight. The gaseous oxygen flow control valves were shimmed to a target 
position corresponding to a 80.6-percent flow area. The minimum liquid oxygen 
ullage pressure experienced during the period of ullage pressure slump was 
14.6 psid. The liquid oxygen ullage pressure transducers did not remain within 
an OMRSD File IX-required 0.9-psi band between cry0 loading and MECO. While 
liquid oxygen ullage pressure 2 and 3 tracked each other closely, liquid oxygen 
ullage pressure 1 read lower than the others, reaching a maximum differential of 
0.95 psia about two minutes after lift-off. Feed system performance was normal, 
and liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen propellant conditions were within 
specified limits during all phases of operation. All net positive suction 
pressure (NPSP) requirements were met. Propellant dump and vacuum inerting were 
accomplished satisfactorily. 
Reaction Control Subsystem 
The performance of the RCS was acceptable; however, two anomalies were 
identified. Propellant consumption during the mission was 5297.4 lb which 
includes the forward RCS propellant dump before landing. The RCS was used to 
support DTO 251 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test; however, not all the 
planned programmed test inputs (PTIts) were completed because of an aileron trim 
problem near Mach 10. These totals do not include the OMS propellant consumed 
during RCS/OMS interconnect operations. 
The RCS thruster L1U heater was declared failed on at 177:23:42 G.m. t. 
(00:07:30 MET) (Flight Problem STS-50-V-01). This is the first flight of this 
thruster, and the maximum temperature reached was 15g0 F. The crew turned off 
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the heater when it was declared failed. Five other thrusters were also affected 
by turning off heater power (RlU, RlR, RIA, LlL, and LIA). The crew managed the 
thruster heaters to maintain temperatures within the 60° F to 160" F range for 
all thrusters. This was the same plan that was used on STS-49 to manage a 
similar failure. Early in the mission (approximately flight day 2), a 
subsequent failure within the heater controller limited the power to the L1U 
heater. As a result of this second failure, the temperature of the thruster was 
maintained at approximately 135O F for the remainder of the mission with no . 
further manual cycles required. . 
During the RCS hot-f ire test, conducted at 190:07:50 G.m. t. (012: 15:38 MET), 
thruster F2F was deselected as "failed offu because of low chamber pressure on 
the first pulse of the thruster (Flight Problem STS-50-V-18). The maximum 
chamber pressure reached was 5.5 psia. Injector temperature .traces indicated 
some oxidizer and fuel flowed through both valves to the combustion chamber. 
The most likely failure mode was full fuel flow and oxidizer pilot-valve-only 
operation. Vehicle rates indicated that the thruster did not fire. Failure of 
the oxidizer valve main stage to open is most likely due to an accumulation of 
iron nitrates. 
Vernier RCS thruster F5L was deselected as "failed leak" when the injector 
temperatures dropped below the leak detect limit of 130° F. It was determined 
that the leak indication was false and the thruster was reselected and fired. 
The vernier thruster heaters are undersized and in the cold attitude coupled 
with a low duty cycle, the temperatures can drop below the leak detect limits. 
Vernier thruster temperatures were managed by employing a tighter deadband to 
ensure a higher duty cycle. 
Data showed that thruster R1R experienced a fuel injector temperature drop after 
the orbit adjust (OMS-3) maneuver, indicating some fuel flow had occurred. It 
is believed that the temperature drop was caused by a valve bounce resulting 
from the pressure transients caused by the shutdown of thruster RlU. The RCS 
thruster valve is a pressure-assisted valve and pressure surges through the 
system (i.e., thruster shutdowns and start ups could cause a large pressure 
differential between the valve inlet and the valve upper cavity). Should the 
pressure differential be high enough, the sealing capability of the valve can be 
degraded and allow a small amount of propellant to pass. This phenomenon is 
understood and has been seen on previous flights. 
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem 
The OMS performance during the mission was satisfactory with three dual-engine 
firings completed normally: 
a. OMS-2 - a 141.6-second maneuver with a AV of 222.0 ft/sec. , 
b. OMS-3 - a 30.8-second maneuver with a AV of 49.6 ft/sec. 
c. Deorbit - a 203.9-second maneuver with a AV of 341.9 ft/sec. 
.. 
Propellant usage during the three maneuvers plus during RCS interconnect 
operations was 10,352.1 lb of oxidizer and 6112.0 lb of fuel. Propellant usage 
was 2.17 percent during the right-OMS-to-right-RCS interconnect and 2.38 percent 
during left-OMS-to-left-RCS interconnect operations. 
.In 
The right O ~ S  yaw actuator moved approximately 0.24 degree during ascent. The 
movement began at lift-off and ended shortly after the period of max Q was 
completed (Flight Problem STS-50-V-06). On-orbi t OMS firing and en try 
aerodynamic data indicated the no-back device operated properly. A more 
detailed discussion of this anomaly is provided in the Avionics and Software 
Subsystem section of this report. 
Both the left and right oxidizer gaging systems as well as the left-hand forward 
fuel gaging sys tem performed satisfactorily. Approximately 14 seconds into the 
OMS-3 maneuver, the right-hand fuel total quantity measurement shifted from 
42.8 percent to 50.8 percent (Flight Problem STS-50-V-19). This anomaly 
resulted in high readings on the total quantity gaging system following the 
deorbit maneuver. The offset associated with the forward probe has occurred on 
other pods, but this is the first anomaly on a redesigned probe. 
The OMS fuel high-point bleed heater system A control thermostat that is located 
on the aft bulkhead high point bleed line failed off (Flight Problem 
STS-50-V-14). The loss of this heater did not impact the mission as the 
overtemperature thermostat for the A heater was functioning normally as well as 
the B-heater thermos tats. 
Power Reactant Storage and' is tiibution Subsys tern 
STS-50 was the first flight of the ED0 pallet which carried four cryogenic tank 
sets in addition to the normal four tank sets carried on the Orbiter. The PRSD 
subsystem including the ED0 pallet performed satisfactorily in meeting all 
mission requirements. The ED0 pallet tanks began supplying hydrogen and oxygen 
\ about 24 hours into the flight and operated satisfactorily throughout the 
mission. A total of 549.7 lb of hydrogen was consumed from the eight-tank-set 
configuration, and 4735 lb of oxygen was consumed of which 209.8 lb was consumed 
by the crew and 160 lb leaked overboard from oxygen tank 2. After landing, the 
calculated mission extension capability based on oxygen remaining was 56 hours. 
The PRSD subsystem oxygen tank 2 pressure indicated a decrease at the rate 
equivalent to a leak of approximately 0.9 lb/hr throughout the flight (Flight 
Problem STS-50-V-08). Leakage from this tank did not impact mission duration or 
entry as the tank 2 management plan called for 125 lb of oxygen to be used from 
this tank early in the mission to ensure that the 13-day plus 2-day contingency 
capability was preserved in the remaining PRSD tanks. 
Prior to the mission, a known leak in the airborne half of the fill quick 
disconnect (QD) poppet existed. Since the leak was within specification and 
since a flight cap was to be installed, the known leak was acceptable for 
flight. During postflight leak testing, it was discovered that the flight cap 
had not been properly torqued. This lack of proper torque damaged the cap seal 
.. 
and allowed the QD leak to resume and at a higher rate than seen before the 
flight. 
.. 
At 186:02:00 G.m.t. (08:09:48 MET), data showed that the PRSD oxygen tank 7 
pressure was tracking the manifold pressure that feeds the fuel cells. Tank 7 
heaters were not powered; therefore, the tank should not have been feeding the 
manifoldlfuel cells at that time. The tank 7 pressure behavior was an 
indication of a stuck-open check valve in tank 7 (Flight Problem STS-50-V-12). 
Configuring to tank-7-operation-only to increase the flow through the check 
valve did not correct the problem. The check valve reseated and began 
functioning nominally at 190:14:10 G.m.t. (12:21:58 MET), but stuck open again 
during entry. This anomaly did not impact the successful completion of the 
planned mission. The valve will be replaced during postflight turnaround 
activities. 
At 189:17:35 G.m.t. (12:01:23 MET), the PRSD oxygen tank 3 quantity measurement 
began shifting erratically from 80 percent to off-scale-high (Flight Problem 
STS-50-V-20). The measurement later stabilized at the nominal quantity. The 
erratic behavior did not impact the successful completion of the mission. 
The oxygen tank 2 heater A2 "onn indication was intermittent (Flight Problem 
STS-50-V-05). Pressure and amperage data indicated that the heater was 
operating intermittently as well. The data indicate that the problem existed in 
the heater control box and not in the heater element itself. This conclusion 
was supported by the fact that the indication was downstream of the control box 
and upstream of the heater. 
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem 
Performance of the fuel cell powerplant subsystem was nominal during the mission 
except for the fuel cell 3 purge valve failure discussed in the following 
paragraph. During the 331.5-hour mission, the fuel cells produced 6204.7 kwh of 
electrical energy and 4914.6 lb of potable water from 4364.9 lb of oxygen and 
549.7 lb of hydrogen. The average total Orbiter electrical power/load was 
18.7 kW/625 amperes. The fuel cells were shut down at 192:08:34 G.m.t. Fuel 
cell 1, 2, and 3 operating times for the mission were 364.8, 364.0, and 
363.3 hours, respectively. 
At 181:11:41 G.m.t., (03:19:29 MET) the fuel cell 3 oxygen purge valve failed to 
close completely after the completion of the eighth fuel cell purge (Flight 
Problem STS-50-V-07). The oxygen flow rate remained high at 70 percent of the 
purge flow rate, indicating a partially open oxygen purge valve. Ten minutes 
later, the valve was manually opened to the full purge flow rate for 10 seconds; 
the valve was then manually closed and the valve reseated completely. The 
probable cause of the anomaly was the presence of fuel cell corrosion products 
under the valve seat that cleared during the manual purge. Because of the 
possibility of the valve sticking open again during subsequent purges, a 
decision was made to refrain from purging fuel cell 3 for the rest of the 
mission unless performance degraded to near the end of the life curve. The 
performance degraded only 0.4 volt for the last 240 hours of the mission, and no 
purge was required. The valve operated nominally during the postlanding purge 
operations. 
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem 
. 
Improved auxiliary power unit (IAPU) were flown in all three APU slots. This 
was the first flight of OV-102 with the IAPUts. Two anomalies were noted, 
neither of which impacted the successful completion of the mission. Run-times -. 
for the IAPUts as well as propellant consumption are shown in the table on the 
following page. 
a APU 1 was operated for 4 minutes 5 seconds after landing; APU 2 was operated for 
18 minutes 59 seconds after landing; and APU 3 was operated for 19 minutes 
3 seconds after landing. 
After ascent and following the APU tank/fuel line B heater system activation, 
the APU 3 test line heater cycled low and the test line temperature sensor 1 
indicated a temperature that was near the lower fault detection and annunciation 
(FDA) limit of 48O F (Flight Problem STS-50-V-09). When the heaters were 
reconfigured to the A system, the test line heater initially cycled at a higher 
than normal range. The test line temperature 2 measurement sensor exceeded the 
FDA upper limit of 95O F, Table maintenance block updates (TMBUts) were sent to 
change the limit to llOo F. Shortly after the TMBU, the temperature measurement 
exceeded the 110° F limit and a new TMBU was sent to change the upper limit to 
120' F. Following these changes, the heater cycled nominally but had unusually 
low and high peaks. 
About 22 minutes after APU 1 was started for entry, the gearbox pressure 
measurement became erratic (Flight Problem STS-50-V-22). This erratic.behavior 
caused the measurement to intermittently fail off-scale low (0 psia), which 
caused the APU controller to activate the gearbox repressurization circuit . The 
measurement failed to zero six times and this resulted in the complete dumping 
of the gaseous nitrogen from the repressuri'zation bottle into the gearbox. 
During the repressurization, the gearbox pressure increased from about 8 psia to 
28 psia. This increase in pressure was within the operational range of the APU. 
Because of this anomaly, the crew was instructed to shut down APU 1 about 
4 minutes after landing. 
Flight Phase 
Ascent 
FCS ckeckout 
Entry- 
TO tala 
IAPU 3 (S/N 402) 
The APU 1, 2, and 3 seal cavity drain line relief valves appeared to be leaking 
during the on-orbit portion of the flight. APU 1 pressure decreased from 
15 psia to 11 psia while the APU 2 and 3 relief valves leaked from 15 psia to 
about 5 psia. 
Time, 
min:sec 
19:37 
07 : 09 
84: 19 
111:05 
IAPU 2 (S/N 403) 
A hydraulic loads test was performed after landing to determine the roughness of 
the gas generators after their first flight. Due to the APU 1 being shut down 
about 4 minutes after landing, the load test was only performed on APUts 2 and 
3. Both of these systems had acceptable roughness measurements below 50 psi. A 
hydraulic loads test will be performed on APU 1 after its next flight. 
Fuel 
consumption, 
lb 
54 
19 
177 
250 
IAPU 1 (S/N 204K) 
Time, 
min:sec 
19: 37 
63 : 03 
82:40 
Time, 
min:sec 
19: 37 
48 : 10 
67 : 47 
Fuel 
consumption, 
lb 
5 3 
152 
205 
Fuel 
consumption, 
lb 
48 
84 
132 
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem a 
The hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystem operated satisfactorily throughout 
the mission. Three anomalous conditions were noted, none of which impacted the 
successful completion of the planned mission. 
At approximately 179:21:59:50 G.m.t. (02:05:47 MET), the hydraulic circulation 
pump 2 pressure transducer indication went to 0 psia (Flight Problem 
STS-50-V-10). The main pump filter module transducer continued to read 
approximately 200 psia, indicating nominal circulation pump performance. While 
this condition was occurring, the vehicle entered loss-of-signal (LOS). During 
LOS, the crew received an FDA alarm indicating a loss of circulation pump 
pressure and the pump was deactivated. About 10 minutes after the initial 
indication, the circulation pump 2 pressure transducer returned to the normal 
reading of 50 psia while in the off position. The temporary loss of the 
measurement was evaluated . A backup pressure measurement was available and was 
used during subsequent circulation pump operations. A TMBU was transmitted to 
disable the FDA alarms for the primary pressure transducer to preclude nuisance 
alarms during pump operations. The circulation pumps remained in the automatic 
mode for thermal control of the hydraulic subsystem. 
Data from a series of six recharges of the hydraulic system 2 accumulator 
indicate a leak of GN2 from the system 2 bootstrap accumulator (Flight Problem 
STS-50-V-15). The first four recharges showed nominal GN2 pressures of 
approximately 2500 psi. However, the fifth recharge at approximately 
188:15:44 G.m.t. (10:23:32 MET) and the sixth recharge 7 hours 15 minutes later 
showed pressures of 2356 and 2127 psi, respectively. Continuous manual 
operation of the circulation pump began at 189:06:03 G.m.t. (11:13:51 MET) after 
the recharge began under GPC mode with a set pressure point of 1960 psi. The 
concern was that loss of GN2 pressure could result in loss of head pressure to 
the main hydraulic pump. Main pump start with loss of reservoir/bootstrap 
pressure is uncertified. Head pressure was maintained with manual circulation 
pump 2 operation. 
During a long operational run of circulation pump 2 to recharge the accumulator, 
the data indicate an excessive temperature rise and leakage from hydraulic 
system 2 to system 1 and system 3 (Flight Problem STS-50-V-25). Leakage from 
hydraulic system 2 into system 1 was approximately 10 percent and into system 3 
was approximately 28 percent. Later in the flight, circulation pump 3 was 
operated to return some of the hydraulic fluid to system 1 and 2. 
Following the Orbiter landing, a hydraulic load test was performed on APUts 2 
and 3, after which the two APU1s were shut down by 191:12:01:03 G.m.t. 
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem 
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDCC) subsystem performed 
satisfactorily throughout the mission. All electrical functions associated with 
the ED0 pallet and drag chute (both flown on this vehicle for the first time) 
were performed nominally. 
Pyrotechnics Subsystem 
The pyrotechnics subsystem performed all required functions in a satisfactory 
manner. The nose gear extension thruster operated correctly. All drag chute 
pyrotechnics operated as planned culminating the second use of the drag chute on 
a Space Shuttle vehicle. 
During the postflight inspection, two expended umbilical attachment pyrotechnic 
connectors were found on the runway under the right Orbi ter/ET umbilical door. 
This Orbiter did not have the umbilical attachment debris containment 
modification; consequently, this condition was not unexpected. 
Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem 
Atmospheric Revitalization System.- The atmospheric revitalization system (ARS) 
performed nominally except for the RCRS. 
The ARS air and water coolant loops performance was nominal, and the CO partial 
pressure was maintained below 7.25 mm Hg. The cabin air temperature an 8 
relative humidity peaked at 80.5O F and 57.0 percent, respectively. The 
avionics bay 1, 2, and 3 air outlet temperatures peaked at 104.5' F, 107.5' F, 
and 90.25O F, respectively, and the avionics bay 1, 2, and 3 water coldplate 
temperatures peaked at 90.5O F, 93.0' F, and 88.0' F, respectively. 
STS-50 was the first flight of the RCRS. The RCRS was activated shortly after 
orbital insertion and operated satisfactorily for the first 25 hours of the 
mission. The RCRS uses regenerable solid amine to adsorb C02 and water from the 
Orbiter cabin environment instead of non-regenerable LiOH. 
Beginning at 178:13:38 G.m.t. (00:21:26 MET), the RCRS experienced a total of 
six shutdowns (Flight Problem STS-50-V-02). Both controllers were affected by 
the shutdowns. The cause of the shutdowns was determined to be shorting of the 
shaft position sensor circuits in a vacuum cycle valve actuator near an actuator 
shaft bearing. The RCRS was deactivated at 01:06:06 MET and fresh LiOH 
canisters were installed in the Spacelab and in the Orbiter. 
An IFM procedure was developed for regaining single-string operation of the 
RCRS. Development included duplicating the failure condition in the 
ground test facility, performing the IFM procedure, and verifying the RCRS 
operation by a two-hour verification run. The procedure was initiated onboard 
the Orbiter at approximately 182: 12: 12 G.m. t. (04:20:00 MET). The procedure, 
which required about 4 hours and 45 minutes to complete, began with the removal 
of four stowage lockers and the volume D floor panel to gain access to the RCRS 
controller wiring. The crew then removed the controller 2 J8 connector 
backshell, after which the wire pairs for the actuators'clockwise position 
indicator were identified. The wire pairs were cut and spliced together to 
bypass the indicators, and the RCRS was powered up. 
Following the IFM, the RCRS began single-string operation at 182:16:57 G.m.t. 
(05:00:45 MET), and operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission. 
The RCRS maintained the Orbiter cabin atmosphere CO level between 4.0 and 
4.5 mmHg, and the Spacelab C02 level tracked about to 1.25 mmHg higher than 
the Orbiter, as expected, once the tunnel duct cap was removed. 
Pressure Control System.- The cabin and PP02 pressure control system performance 
was normal throughout the mission. The Spacelab pressure control system was 
used for the first five days of the flight and the Orbiter pressure control 
system was used for the remainder of the flight. 
Active Thermal Control System.- The active thermal control system operated 
nominally throughout the mission. Satisfactory cooling was provided to the 
Spacelab at the payload heat exchanger. The radiator cold soak provided vehicle 
cooling from flash evaporator system (FES) deactivation through landing plus 
10 minutes. The ammonia boiler system B, operating on the primary controller, 
provided cooling for 39 minutes until the ammonia supply was depleted and ground 
support equipment (GSE) cooling was initiated. 
Supply and Waste Water Systems.- The supply and waste water management systems 
performed adequately throughout the mission. By the completion of the mission, 
all of the associated supply water in-flight checkout requirements and all but 
one of the waste water requirements had been satisfied. 
Supply water was managed through the use of the FES. No supply water dumps 
through the dump nozzle were performed because of the vehicle cooling 
requirements. The supply water dump line temperature was maintained between 
72 and 110 OF throughout the mission with the operation of the line heater. 
Waste water was gathered at approximately the predicted flow rate. Four waste 
water dumps were performed. The first three dumps had an average dump rate of 
1.94 percent/minute (3.21 lb/min), while the last segment of dump three and all 
of dump four were degraded in flow (Flight Problem STS-50-V-16). Dump four 
averaged 0.9 percent/minute (1.49 lb/min), and slowed to less than 
0.5 percent/minute before being terminated. At the time of termination, 
adequate ullage was available to support the end-of-mission timelines. The 
waste water dump line temperature was maintained between 53 and 7S0 F throughout 
the mission while the vacuum vent line temperature was between 59 and 75' F. 
Waste Collection System.- The waste collection system (WCS) performed adequately 
throughout the mission. The crew reported a whining noise being produced from 
the coffee can when a bag was not installed. 
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem 
There were no smoke detector alarms and the fire extinguishers were not required 
or used. 
Airlock Support System and Tunnel Adapter 
The airlock was not used for extravehicular activity, but along with the tunnel 
adapter provided intravehicular access to the Spacelab. The tunnel duct cap, 
which is redundant to the manual payload isolation valve in the event of a 
Spacelab module air leak, was not removed during Spacelab activation. The cap 
was not removed because the crew was not aware that the cap must be removed and 
no written procedures existed that required the cap removal. As a result, there a .  
was no forced air transfer between the Spacelab and the Orbiter cabins across 
hatch D. However, the Spacelab C02 system controlled the Orbiter C02 level for a 
two days and the Orbiter system controlled the Spacelab CO level for three days 
with only a 2-mmHg differential between the two cabins. ~ 8 e  cap was removed on 
flight day 8, and within three hours the CO difference between the two cabins 
was decreased to a nominal level of 1.0 to 2.25 mmHg. 
Avionics and Software Subsystem 
The integrated guidance, navigation and control subsystem performed nominally 
throughout the mission. The flight control system performed satisfactorily with 
the exception of the OMS no-back operation. The right OMS yaw actuator moved 
approximately 0.24 degree during ascent (Flight Problem STS-50-V-06). The 
movement began at lift-off and ended shortly after the period of max Q was 
completed. The 0.24-degree movement indicated slippage of the actuator 
"no-back" device. The OMRSD File IX limit is 0.20 degree; however, 0.24-degree 
movement was determined not to be a concern for entry. Redundancy management 
monitors actuator movement and drives the engine back to the stowed position if 
the movement exceeds 0.7 degree. This precludes the engine nozzle from entering 
the air stream where engine/nozzle damage could result. Entry aerodynamic data 
indicated the no-back device operated properly. 
The IMU performance was satisfactory during the mission; however, a problem was 
noted during the prelaunch countdown. During the T-9 minute hold, the IMU 3 
gyro drift rate exceeded the specification of 0.09 deg/hr by 0.0011 deglhr 
during an IRAMS filter pass. Af ter the next filter pass, the drift rate was 
within specification. Since the data were acceptable during the subsequent 
filter passes, no LCC were violated, and the countdown was not held for this @ problem. 
The star tracker performance, as well as the data processing system and flight 
software, was satisfactorily. 
The displays and controls subsystem performed satisfactorily except for the 
forward starboard payload bay floodlight. At 191:08:25 G.m.t. (13:16:13 MET) 
during the payload bay (PLB) door closure operations, the starboard forward PLB 
door floodlight failed (Flight Problem STS-50-V-21). The loss of the floodlight 
did not affect the remaining PLB operations. 
The operational instrumentation (01) performance was acceptable with three 
anomalies. Neither of these anomalies compromised the successful completion of 
the mission. 
At approximately 179:21:59:50 G.m.t. (02:05:47:27 MET), the hydraulic 
circulation pump 2 pressure transducer indication went to 0 psia. The main pump 
filter module transducer continued to read approximately 200 psia, indicating 
nominal circulation pump performance. The anomaly is discussed in more detail 
.. in the Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler section of this report. 
At 186:11:05 G.m.t. (08:18:53 MET), the Orbiter experiments (OEX) recorder was 
.. 
commanded to mark 5, but the recorder skipped the mark and continued to the end 
of the tape (Flight Problem STS-50-V-24). The recorder was commanded back to 
mark 5 and the recorder stopped at the mark. A label command was then sent and 
the recorder did not function as commanded. After an all-stop command and a 
label command were sent, the recorder operated properly for the remainder of the 
mission. 
* 
At 191:10:41 G.m.t. (13:18:29 MET), the beginning of the OMS deorbit maneuver, 
the modular auxiliary data sys tern (MADS) frequency data mu1 tiplexer (FDM) 1, 
multiplexer 4 built-in test equipment (BITE) indicated an intermittent failure 
(Flight Problem STS-50-V-23). This anomaly did not impact the successful v 
completion of the mission. 
Communications and Tracking Subsystem 
Performance of the communications and tracking subsystem was acceptable with 
five anomalies identified. None of the anomalies impacted the successful 
completion of the mission. 
An unscheduled UHF-communications-only DTO (not planned for STS-50) was 
performed at lift-off plus 107 seconds when an incorrect air-to-ground 1 only 
transmission was performed instead of a UHF-only transmission. The UHF-only 
check was performed at lift-off plus 2 minutes, but this time was too late to 
provide conclusive data. 
Closed circuit television (CCTV) camera A video downlink contained numerous 
lines of noise (Flight Problem STS-50-V-03). The problem was intermit tent in 
nature and did not impact video operations. 
An IFM procedure was performed on the text and graphics system (TAGS), which had 
malfunctioned during an uplink at approximately 179:21:44 G.m.t. (02:05:32 MET) 
(Flight Problem STS-50-V-04). The crew reported that the upper booster roller 
a 
turned and then stopped, indicating that the developer motor had failed. The 
TAGS was powered off and was not used for the remainder of the mission. As a 
result, the portable audio data modem (PADM) was used with the payload and 
general support computer (PGSC) for graphics uplink. 
The CCTV camera D heater failed off at 181:14:00 G.m.t. (03:21:48 MET) (Flight 
Problem STS-50-V-11). Camera temperatures as low as -13O C were noted. Camera 
temperatures below -2g0 C could have resulted in the operational loss of camera 
D. Acceptable camera temperatures were maintained for the remainder of the 
mission by powering the camera heater on whenever temperatures were low. 
The crew stated that the MKII camcorder (flight deck unit) would no longer image 
a video picture at 187:22:00 G.m.t. (10:05:48 MET), and a blank screen would 
appear each time the camcorder was used as a video unit (Flight Problem 
STS-50-V-13). However, the camera still operated satisfactorily in the playback 
mode. The crew tried to troubleshoot the failed camera by selecting the auto 
mode; however, the screen was still blank when the unit was used as a camera. 
It was noted in a video playback at 189:22:37 G.m.t. (12:06:25 MET) that CCTV 
camera C provided no video image (Flight Problem STS-50-V-17). Camera operation 
could not be regained. No significant data were lost because of this camera ' 1  
failure. 
@ At 186:14:28 G.m. t. (08:22:16 MET), the camcorder dump video exhibited poor quality color (rainbowing, and no color lock). NASA Ground Terminal (NGT), 
which is located at White Sands, attempted a failover to backup color processing 
. equipment with no success. NGT reported an IRE value that was less than 
25 percent of the nominal color burst value. A subsequent dump, however, 
exhibited good color lock but marginal color saturation. The color quality was 
deemed acceptable, and the camera was used for the remainder of the mission. 
The performance of the S-band lower right antenna degraded during the mission. 
The S-band system occasionally dropped the forward link on the lower right 
antenna. The reflected power from this.antenna was not constant and some of the 
dropouts occurred when switching between the antennas. Investigation is 
continuing in an effort to isolate the problem. 
CCTV camera B had a spot burned on the image tube and this resulted in degraded 
video transmissions. The camera, however, remained usable for the duration of 
the mission. 
Structures and Mechanical Subsystem 
All mechanically actuated systems performed nominally including the vent doors, 
ETIOrbiter umbilical doors, payload bay doors, star tracker doors, Ku-Band 
antenna deployment actuator , and air data probe deployment sys ten. The landing 
and braking data are shown in the table on the following page. 
@ All landing and braking parameters were nominal with the exception of one of the four pressures (right-hand outboard 4 ) ,  which was biased low by about 400 psi 
(Flight Problem STS-50-V-26). The main landing gear tires were in good 
condition with less-than-expected wear for the heavy Orbiter weight and a KSC 
runway landing. 
STS-50 was the second flight of the drag chute and the first on this vehicle, 
and the drag chute performed as expected with no problems noted. The sequence 
of drag chute events began with deployment at nose wheel touchdown. The drag 
chute door landed approximately 8700 ft down the runway, bounced three times and 
then slid for 30 ft before stopping. The sabot landed at approximately 8800 ft 
down the runway. The mortar cover was found off the edge of the runway and 
approximately 8800 ft from the threshold. The pilot chute was found at the 
8950-foot point on the runway, and the reefing line was found at the 11,300-foot 
point on the runway. The main chute was found at the 12,500-foot point, and the 
Orbiter wheels-stop occurred at the 13,000 ft point. 
During the postlanding inspection, the port payload bay door "dogbone seal" 
between panels one and two was protruding (Flight Problem STS-50-V-27). 
. . Aerodynamics, Heating, and Thermal Interfaces 
The ascent aerodynamics were nominal with no problems reported or observed in 
. . the data. The entry aerodynamics were satisfactory, although some problems were 
noted. The control surfaces for the most part responded at the forward c.g. as 
expected; however, during the performance of DTO 251 - Entry Aerodynamic Control 
Surfaces Test, the aileron trim appeared divergent near Mach 10, eventually 
LANDING AND BRAKING PARAMETERS 
reaching 1.7 degrees with spikes as high as 2.2 degrees at Mach 8. At this 
point, the PTIts were terminated because a flight-rule trim limit of 1.5 degrees 
is specified. The aerodynamic model had predicted that no more than 0.5 degree 
of roll trim would be required. No vehicle control or stability problems were 
encountered and the anomaly is being investigated (Flight Problem STS-50-V-28). 
Parameter 
Main gear touchdown 
Nose gear touchdown 
Only two of the six PTIts to be performed in conjunction with DTO 0251 - Part 1 
were completed. PTI one was not performed because of the proximity to the bank 
reversal maneuver. Also, PTI1s four through six were inhibited because of the 
aileron trim problem discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
All thermal interface temperatures were maintained within limits and no 
violations of the LCC were observed. The integrated heating also was nominal in 
all areas. 
From 
threshold, 
ft 
2428 
7849 
Thermal Control Subsystem 
Drag chute deploy 137.6 knots (keas) 
Braking initiation speed 112.9 knots 
Drag chute jettison 51.2 knots 
Brake-on time 28.4 seconds 
Rollout distance 10,674 feet 
Rollout time 58.5 seconds 
Orbiter weight at landing 225,615.2 lb 
The performance of the Orbiter thermal control system was nominal during all 
phases of the flight with the exception of two in-flight anomalies. All Orbiter 
subsystem temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits. 
Speed, 
keas 
205.2 
144.9 
Energy, 
million ft-lb 
25.67 
27.50 
19.43 
12.76 
Brake sensor location 
Left-hand inboard 1 
Left-hand inboard 3 
Left-hand outboard 2 
Left-hand outboard 4 
Right-hand inboard 1 
Right-hand inboard 3 
Right-hand outboard 2 
Right-hand outboard 4 
Sink rate, ft/sec 
"2.0 
n/a 
Pitch rate, 
deg/sec 
n/a 
4.4 
Pressure, 
psia 
1080 
1212 
1164 
996 
936 
984 
1008 
588 
Brake assembly 
Left-hand outboard 
Left-hand inboard 
Right-hand inboard 
Right-hand outboard 
The RCS thruster L1U heater was declared failed on at 177:23:42 G.m.t. 
(00:07:30 MET) (Flight Problem STS-50-V-01). This anomaly is discussed in 
detail in the Reaction Control Subsystem section of this report. 
The hydraulic brake line heaters were activated at 190:13:00 G.m.t. 
(12:20:48 MET) for the first entry attempt, and one of the left MLG brake line 
temperatures increased to 267O F prior to deactivation of the heaters about 
four hours later. Temperatures between 100° F and 160° F were expected. It is 
believed that the heater element is wrapped on or near the temperature 
transducer and that the actual line temperature was much less than the indicated 
temperature. The heaters were selectively activated to maintain the desired 
temperatures during entry. 
Aerothermodynamics 
The aero thermodynamics performance during entry was nominal. The slumped tiles 
aft of the ET umbilical door is the only concern in this area. All structural 
temperatures were maintained within limits and the structural temperature rise 
noted was within the experience base. 
Thermal Protection Subsystem 
The TPS performance was nominal based on structural temperature response data 
and some tile surf ace temperature measurement data. The overall boundary layer 
transition from laminar to turbulent flow was non-symmetric. Transition 
occurred 1200 seconds after entry interface on the aft portion of the vehicle, 
and at 1300 seconds after entry interface on the forward side of the vehicle. 
This is the latest transition time recorded for the forward section of the 
vehicle. 
The Orbiter thermal surfaces were inspected and 184 debris impact damage sites 
were noted, of which 45 had a major dimension of 1 inch or greater. This total 
does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME 
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these 
numbers to statistics from previous missions of similar configuration indicates 
that the total number of hits 1 inch or larger is much higher than average. 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained 141 hits, of which 28 had a major dimension 
of 1 inch or greater. The distribution of hits on the lower surface does not 
point to a single source of ascent debris, but does indicate a shedding of ice 
and TPS debris from random sources. The most significant damage site measured 
9 inches by 4.5 inches by 0.5 inch, spanned three tiles, and was located 
approximately 3 ft outboard of the ET/Orbiter liquid hydrogen umbilical. The 
distribution and size of debris impact on the lower surface does not point to a 
single source, and is indicative of random shedding of ice and low-density TPS 
material. 
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes. 
There was no visible damage to the reusable-carbon-carbon (RCC) nosecap or wing 
leading edge panels. However, white streaks were present on the right-hand wing 
leading edge panels 2, 6, 17, and 18. 
Damage to the bare heat shield tiles was less than average. No tiles around the 
drag chute opening were damaged. The main engine closeout blanket on SSME 3 was 
badly torn and frayed in one location. Two of the sacrificial patches from this 
area were missing. The blanket on SSME 2 was in good condition. The 
sacrificial patch on the SSME 1 blanket at the 4:00 to 6:30 o'clock position 
exhibited significant fraying. 
All Orbiter windows exhibited lighter-than-usual hazing. Window 4 exhibited a 1 
few light streaks. The Orbiter window perimeter damage was less than usually 
observed. 
The postflight inspection of the thermal panes of the flight deck windows 
revealed six impact damage sites. The six damage sites were found on windows 2, 
3, 4, 6, and 8, with window 4 (starboard forward) having the largest impact site 
(0.0605 inch diameter and 0.00447 inch depth) of any observed in the Space 
Shuttle Program. As a result, window 4 was removed and sent to JSC for scanning 
electron microscope analysis of the damage site, as this is the only type of 
analysis that can determine the projectile material. 
The remaining windows had impact pits that were comparable to those observed 
previously during the program. Windows 6 and 8 were also removed after analysis 
showed inadequate strength remaining for another flight. Overhead window 8 was 
damaged by an orbital impact. STS-50 involved pointing the overhead windows 
into the velocity vector for approximately 12 days, which was much longer than 
any previous flight. This attitude is the worst for orbital impacts on the 
overhead windows, and as a result, an orbital impact on window 8 was not 
surprising. 
A portable Shuttle thermal imager (STI) was used to measure the surface 
temperatures of several areas on the vehicle. Nine minutes after landing, the 
Orbiter nose cap RCC was 202O F; the right-hand wing leading edge RCC panel 9 
was 118' F, and panel 17 was 115O F 22 minutes after landing. 
GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EOUIPMENT/FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT 
The flight crew equipment performed satisfactorily throughout the mission. A 
35-mm Nikon F4 camera failed. The crew reported that a shutter leaf was visible 
floating loose inside the camera. This failure did not impact photography 
operations as one additional Nikon F4 camera was available. 
The crew reported that the 16-mm Arriflex camera operated intermittently 
throughout the mission. This same intermittent operation has been noted on 
previous flights. Postflight testing, both at JSC and the vendor, has failed to 
duplicate the problem. 
. . 
CARGO INTEGRATION 
All cargo integration hardware operated satisfactorily during the STS-50 
mission. 
PAYLOADS 
The United States Microgravity Laboratory -1 (USML-1) was the first in a series 
that will build a vital microgravity program linking NASA, academia, and private 
industry in investigations of fundamental microgravity sciences. 
NASA has established a long-term space laboratory program that is designed to 
build the United States leadership in microgravity science and technology. The 
program pioneers investigations into the role of gravity in five basic areas: 
fluid dynamics; crystal growth; combustion science; biological science; and 
technology demonstration; and introduced several large experiment facilities 
that were designed for multiple users and multiple flights. Spacelab activities 
ended on July 8 with the deactivation of the Spacelab module. The mission was 
extended one day because of inclement weather at the primary landing site; 
however, no science activities were planned or executed during the extension 
day. 
CRYSTAL GROWTH FACILITY 
The crystal growth facility contains the first space furnace capable of 
automatically processing multiple large samples at temperatures up to 2900' F 
(1600° C). The furnace was operated for 286 hours and processed seven 
electronic crystal samples. Several significant achievements were made during 
the mission: 
a. Investigators uplinked commands in response to downlinked data to 
remotely control the furnace; 
b. Samples were automatically positioned for processing by the sample 
exchange mechanism; and 
c. The crew proved the feasibility and safety of manually exchanging 
furnace samples in a habitable (flexible glovebox) environment. 
Preflight planning scheduled four samples for processing during the mission. 
However, on flight day 4 one of the furnace circuit breakers was inadvertently 
opened, cutting the second sample growth short of the planned time. As a 
result, backup samples were loaded into the furnace and the timeline permitted 
crystal growth on a total of seven samples. 
DROP PHYSICS MODULE 
The drop physics module (DPM) hardware worked perfectly throughout the mission. 
The DPM permitted study of the dynamics of fluids freed from both the influences 
of gravity and the influences of the walls of the container. Some first-time 
experiences on this mission include the following: 
a. The first compound drop (one fluid within another, much like a yolk in 
an egg) was observed; 
b. The first drop coalescence (individual drops merging to form a single 
drop) ; 
c. The smallest and largest drops ever deployed in space; and 
d. The first retrieval of a drop by the module injectors. 
SURFACE TENSION DRIVEN CONVECTION EXPERIMENT APPARATUS 
The surface-tension-driven convection experiment successfully demonstrated that 
surface tension coupled with thermal gradients is a powerful driving force for 
fluid motion, and investigators received excellent data on the response of 
fluids to various thermal geometries. The experiment provided the first 
observations of thermocapillary flows in a curved-surface fluid. All of the 
surface-tension-driven convection experiment hardware, including the 
sophisticated infrared imager and flow visualization systems, operated as 
designed and planned,. 
GLOVEBOX FACILITY 
Operations were faultless on the first flight of this glovebox facility. All 16 
technology demonstrations scheduled for the enclosed mini-laboratory were 
successfully performed. The versatility of the glovebox was proven repeatedly 
in scheduled experiments. The glovebox hosted several experiments that 
complemented investigations in other USML-1 facilities, and intriguing results 
were observed in simple demonstrations ranging from fluid physics and crystal 
growth to combustion science. 
ASTROCULTURE 
Two planned experiment runs and several additional treatments in the 
astroculture plant nutrient delivery system successfully supplied water to 
simulated plant roots. Flow rates for fluid transfer in microgravity were 
correlated with previous ground runs using the As troculture hardware. Results 
indicate that the unit functions as well in microgravity as it does on Earth. 
EXTENDED DURATION ORBITER MEDICAL PROJECT 
The USML-1 was used to conduct the first operations of the ED0 Medical Project's 
(EDOMP) lower body negative pressure device in the Spacelab, and all 10 runs 
performed by the crew were successful. Cardiovascular measurements were made on 
two crew members at the beginning, middle, and end of the flight, and periodic 
air samples were taken to track bacteria or fungal growth. 
On flight day 10, the American Echocardiograph for Research in Space (AERIS) was 
powered down when a flickering on the video screen occurred. The flickering was 
followed by an odor from the vent. As a result, final echocardiograph readings 
were not taken, and the AERIS was not powered for the remainder of the flight. 
However, EDOMP objectives were not significantly impacted by this loss. 
Data collection for this 13-day flight may allow refinement of countermeasures 
that have been developed to protect crew health and well-being during future 
extended duration flights. 
GENERIC BIOPROCESSING APPARATUS 
The maiden flight of the generic bioprocessing apparatus (GBA) with 132 sample 
I containers was successful, although some leakage was experienced with a few of 
the sample containers. Video data of alfalfa and clover, brine shrimp, and 
bacteria indicated that the samples thrived aver the 13-day period. Optical 
density data, downlinked and analyzed, show that processing of other samples was 
as expected. Ground analysis of retrieved samples will allow investigators to 
assess the impact of the microgravity environment on these biomedical specimens. 
PROTEIN CRYSTAL GROWTH 
Even though USML-1 was the fourteenth' flight of the protein crystal growth 
experiment, the STS-50 mission represents the first time that growth conditions 
could be optimized in space. Samples of the middeck experiment benefited from 
the longest period of crystal growth in the history of the Space Shuttle 
Program, allowing several slow-growing crystals to be included in the experiment 
for the first time. In a related glovebox demonstration, the crew set up 
protein crystal growth experiments, then observed them and adjusted conditions 
based on these observations. About 300 samples were processed with an optical 
microscope from a total of 24 protein types, and some of the completed crystals 
could be the largest and/or highest crystalline quality of their type ever grown 
in space. 
SOLID SURFACE COMBUSTION EXPERIMENT 
During the solid surface combustion experiment, filter paper was ignited in a 
sealed container to study the way flames spread over solid fuels in the absence 
of gravity-driven or externally imposed air flows. The experiment video was 
downlinked to the ground and sent to a combustion conference in Australia. It 
was presented in the first published paper of the flight. STS-50 is the 
experiment's fourth flight in an eight-step program, designed to test combustion 
in microgravity. 
SPACE ACCELERATION MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 
The space acceleration measurement system investigators gathered a wealth of 
information to add to their data base on low-frequency accelerations. The 
system collected approximately 1.2 gigabytes of data, roughly equivalent to 1000 
personal computer disks. The triaxial accelerometers were distributed 
throughout the Spacelab module with one specifically attached to the crystal 
growth furnace. 
ZEOLITE CRYSTAL GROWTH 
I. 
The zeolite crystal growth furnace operated as planned on its first Spacelab 
flight, growing crystals in 38 individual autoclaves. Zeolite crystals are used 
as catalysts and adsorbentdfilters in industrial chemical processes. Solutions 
.. 
, that were used to grow zeolite crystals were mixed by the flight crew in the 
glovebox facility in transparent autoclaves to determine optimum mixing 
conditions. After determining optimum mixing conditions, the opaque autoclaves 
were activated on the middeck and inserted into the furnace. 
SHUTTLE AMATEUR RADIO EXPERIMENT 
The Shuttle amateur radio experiment had a very successful mission in which 
almost all mission objectives of configuration E were accomplished. All planned 
communications with students in the United States, Canada, Australia, and South 
Africa were accomplished. In addition to asking questions by voice, a number of 
groups including family members also exchanged slow-scan TV with the crew. Six 
fast-scan TV sessions were supported, but only one of the sessions was 
successful. Modifications to the, antenna may be considered to improve the 
experimental mode of fast-scan TV. 
A special contact was accomplished between Columbia and Hokule, a twin-hulled 
Polynesian sailing canoe currently navigating the Pacific in ancient fashion. 
The Russian spacecraft MIR crew responded to a call from Columbia during a 
contact that was arranged during the flight. Unfortunately, ground interference 
prevented Columbia from receiving the Mir signal. 
An evaluation of a future mode for educational purposes using slow-scan TV in 
auto-frame-grab mode was accomplished on flight day 13 with the camera zoomed in 
close and aimed at the ground track. 
A number of volunteers manned ground stat ions in Honolulu, Hawaii ; Adelaide, 
Australia; Corpus Chris ti, Texas ; Houston, Texas; Johannesburg, South Africa; 
Sao Paulo, Brazil; and Northampton, Australia in support of the many 
phone-bridge contacts that were made during the flight. 
INVESTIGATION INTO POLYMER MEMBRANE PROCESSING 
The investigation into polymer membrane processing (IPMP) units A and B were 
successfully activated at 179:17:35 G.m.t. (02:01:23 MET) and restowed 1 hour 
22 minutes later. Postmission evaluation will determine the success of this 
experiment . 
ULTRAVIOLET PLUME INSTRUMENT 
A state vector was supplied to support investigations with the ultraviolet plume 
instrument (UPI); however, the vernier RCS thruster firings during the mission 
were not suitable for observation. 
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES AND DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES 
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES 
Fifteen of the 17 assigned DTOts were completed. DTO 251 was not completed 
because of aileron trim problems which prevented the performance of all of the 
PTIts, and DTO 805 was not completed as landing crosswinds were below the 
required level for this DTO. The following paragraphs describe the 
accomplishments concerning each DTO. 
DTO 236 - Ascent Aerodynamic Distributed Loads Verification on OV-102 - 
Preliminary data indicate that the biased alpha was achieved. 
2 6 
DTO 251 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test - Only two of the six planned 
PTIts were performed. The first PTI was not performed because of the proximity 
to the entry bank reversal maneuver. The second and third planned PTI were 
performed. The aileron trim appeared divergent near the Mach 10 region where 
the indication was rising through 1.5 degrees. As a result, PTI's four through 
six also were not performed. 
DTO 301D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - Data were collected for 
this DTO, and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor. The results will be 
published by the sponsor in a separate report. 
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability Evaluation - Data were collected for this 
DTO, and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor. The results will be 
published by the sponsor in a separate report. 
DTO 312 - ET TPS Performance (Method 1 and 2) - The three cameras located in the 
ETIOrbiter umbilical recess (one 35-mm and two 16-mm) provided photographic data 
on left SRB separation; however, direct sunlight saturated the field of view, 
obscuring a major portion of all three films. Analysis of the film did provide 
a view of a rectangular shaped divot, measuring 26.5 inches in length and 9.3 
(at it largest) to 4.9 inches in width, and located on the LH /intertank flange 
at the PAL ramp at the base of the left leg of the forward ~ ~ Y ~ r b i t e r  attach 
bipod. 
Eighty-nine hand-held 70-mm Hasselblad frames, taken from the Orbiter flight 
deck after ET separation, were reviewed. The first 65 frames were acquired 
while the window 8 ultraviolet filter was still mounted in the overhead window. 
The frames were underexposed. None of the 70 mm photography showed divots in 
the ET insulation area or in the LH2 or LO2 intertank interfaces. 
DTO 319D - Shuttle/Payload Low Frequency Environment - Data were collected for 
this DTO, and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor. The results of the 
evaluation-will be published by the sponsor in a separate report. 
DTO 413 - On-Orbit PRSD Cryogenic Hydrogen Boiloff - Data were collected for 
this DTO, and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor. The results of the 
evaluation will be published by the sponsor in a separate report. 
DTO 519 - Carbon Brake System Test (Test Condition 5) - Data were collected for 
this DTO, and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor. In addition, brakes 
were removed from one wheel for an in-depth evaluation of the hardware. The 
results of this evaluation will be published by the sponsor in a separate 
report . 
DTO 521 - Orbiter Drag Chute System (Test 0) - The drag chute was deployed and 
evaluation of the photographic data as well as Orbiter data show that the drag 
chute performed satisfactorily. The sponsor will publish the results of the 
evaluation after all tests of this DTO on future flights are completed. 
DTO 623 - Cabin Air Monitoring - Data were collected for this DTO. These data 
have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation 
will be published in a separate report. 
DTO 655 - Foot Restraint Evaluation - The activities required in support of this 
DTO were completed on flight day 12. The data have been given to the sponsor 
for evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be published in a separate 
report by the sponsor. 
DTO 658 - Ergometer Vibration Isolation System Evaluation - The ergometer 
vibration isolation system (EVIS) was used until flight day 6. In-flight video 
and data from the space acceleration measurement system (SAMS), high resolution 
accelerometer package (HiRAP) , and the Orbiter experiments (OEX) orbital 
acceleration research experiment '(OARE) are being evaluated by the sponsor to 
determine if the EVIS is effective as an isolation device for exercise during 
microgravity missions. The results of this evaluation will be published in a 
separate report by the sponsor. 
DTO 663 - Acoustical Noise Dosimeter Data - This DTO was completed and the data 
have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of this DTO will be 
published in a separate report. 
DTO 665 - Acoustical Noise Sound Level Data - Data were collected for this DTO 
and have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results will be 
published in a separate report. 
DTO 666 - Modify ECLSS Supply Air Ducting to Provide Chilled Air to Suited Crew 
Members - This modification was made. The crew commented that the cooling was 
ineffective because an outlet for the air from the suit was not available; 
consequently, there was no air flow through the suit. The crew has recommended 
that the modification not be flown until adequate outlet for airflow through the 
suit can be provided. 
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - Adequate crosswinds were not present 
at the landing site and data were not collected for this DTO. 
DTO 910 - OEX Orbital Acceleration Research Experiment - The OEX Orbital 
Acceleration Research Experiment (OARE) was operated throughout the on-orbit 
phase of the mission and during entry. OARE data were recorded on the payload 
recorder and sent to the ground and, in addition, data pre-processed by the 
OARE1s computer were stored in the OARE1s internal memory for postflight 
transfer to GSE. Preliminary evaluation of data acquired during the mission 
indicated very satisfactory instrument performance. Special Orbiter maneuvers 
required by this DTO were accomplished on flight day 14. The OARE data were not 
recorded on the payload recorder during the extension day. The data are being 
evaluated by the sponsor and will be published in a separate report. 
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES 
DSO 314 - Acceleration Data Collection - Acquisition of High Resolution 
Accelerometer Package (HiRAP) data in support of this DSO were highly . . 
successful. Data were collected during the 1-degree deadband period 
(approximately 1 hour), during a quiet period mid-mission, during the FCS 
checkout and alternate digital autopilot (ALT DAP) operations, and during crew * 
exercise periods. Data collected during crew exercise included periods with the 
ergometer mounted to the ergometer vibration isolation system (EVIS), 
hard-mounted to the floor, and supported by a "bungee cord" harness. Data were 
recorded on the OPS-1 recorder during 15 of the exercise periods and then dumped 
to the ground. Quick-look assessments of these data indicated that the HiRAP 
was performing normally, and that the bungee configuration was not as effective 
as the EVIS in isolating the ergometer from the vehicle in the X-axis. As 
expected, the hard-mounted configuration was noticeably worse in its reflection 
in the data of the vibration. Definitive comparisons are being made during the 
extensive postflight data evaluation. The results will be published in a 
separate report. 
DSO 472 - Intraocular Pressure - This DSO was completed on Payload Specialist 2, 
and the data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of this 
DSO will be published in a separate report. 
DSO 474 - Retinal Photography - The video portion of the DSO was completed with 
the data downlinked in real time. The still photography portion of this DSO was 
not completed because of the loss of the power supply to the Fundus camera. 
DSO 603 - Orthostatic Function During Entry, Landing, and Egress - The DSO was 
completed and the data have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The 
results of the evaluation will be published in a separate report. 
DSO 617 - Evaluation of Functional Skeletal Muscle Performance Following Space 
Flight - Exercise as required by this DSO was performed during the flight and a 
log was maintained. The data are being evaluated by the sponsor, and the 
results will be published in a separate report. 
DSO 618 - Effects of Intense Exercise During Space Flight on Aerobic Capacity 
and Orthostatic Function - This DSO was flown with two subjects; one active and 
one control. The DSO documentation required that the active subject was to 
perform a maximum-level cycle ergometer exercise 18 to 24 hours prior to 
landing. Previous ground-based studies have shown a positive protection of 
aerobic capacity and orthostatic tolerance following this protocol. 
Interpretation of results for the active subject on STS-50 was confounded by the 
24-hour waveof f . The Investigator requested a repeat of the intense exercise, 
but the flight plan could not accommodate the requirement. Therefore, the 
active subject's data could not be interpreted in accordance with the 
experimental design. The control subject's data were valid and unaffected by 
the waveoff. The results of this DSO will be published in a separate report. 
DSO 620 - Physiological Evaluation of Astronaut Seat Egress Ability at Wheels 
Stop - Data for this DSO were collected, and the data are being evaluated by the 
sponsor. The results of this experiment will be published in a separate report. 
DSO 621 - In-Flight Use of Florinef to Improve Orthostatic Intolerance - Data 
for this DSO were collected and have been given to the sponsor. The results of 
the evaluation will be published in a separate report. 
DSO 802 - Educational Activities (Objective 1) - The activities required in 
support of this DSO were completed on flight day 12. The results are being 
evaluated by the sponsor. 
DSO 901 - Documentary Television - The activities in support of the DSO were 
recorded throughout the flight. The video is being evaluated by the sponsor and 
the results will be published in a separate report. 
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - The activities required in 
support of this DSO were accomplished throughout the. flight. The film is being 
evaluated by the sponsor. 
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - The activities required in support of 
this DSO were accomplished throughout the mission. The individual photographs 
are being evaluated by the sponsor. 
DSO 904 - Assessment of Human Factors - Data were collected for this assessment 
and have been given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of this 
evaluation will be published in a separate report. 
PHOTOGRAPHIC AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS 
LAUNCH DATA ANALYSIS 
On launch day, all 23 of the expected videos of launch were evaluated and no 
anomalies were noted. On the days following launch and prior to landing, 59 of 
the 61 expected launch films were analyzed. No anomalies were noted in the 
films; however, one item of interest, which was a bolt hangup on the right SRB 
holddown post number M-4, was noted. The bolt hangup had no effect on the 
successful launch of the vehicle. 
ON-ORBIT DATA ANALYSIS 
The crew obtained 89 photographs of the ET in support of DTO 312. No anomalies 
were noted in the preliminary screening of these photographs. 
LANDING DATA ANALYSIS 
A total of eight landing videos plus NASA Select were received three hours after 
landing for review and analysis. No anomalous events were noted in the landing 
videos. The videos again provided good coverage of the drag chute deployment 
and jettison. 
TABLE I.- STS-50 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
Actual time, 
G.m. t. 
177:16:07:33.98 
177:16:07:34.87 
177:16:07:35.84 
177:16:11:55.33 
177:16:11:56.33 
177:16:11:55.77 
177:16:11:55.77 
177:16:12:16.457 
177:16:12:16.556 
177:16:12:16.696 
177:16:12:22.997 
177:16:12:27.036 
177:16:12:27.057 
177:16:12:27.057 
177:16:12:54.716 
177:16:12:54.737 
177:16:12:54.738 
177:16:13:13 
177:16:13:22.237 
177:16:13:22.258 
177:16:13:22.258 
177:16:14:23.52 
177:16:14:24.20 
177:16:14:25.93 
177:16:14:27.01 
177:16:14:29 
177:16:14:29.32 
177:16:14:29.32 
177:16:19:52.147 
177:16:19:52.216 
177:16:19:52.187 
177:16:19:53.0 
177:16:20:50 
177:16:20:50.225 
177:16:20:50.241 
177:16:20:50.268 
177:16:20:51 
177:16:21:08 
Event 
APU activation 
SRB HPU activation 
Main propulsion 
System start 
SRB ignition command 
(lift-off) 
Throttle up to 
104 percent thrust 
Throttle down to 
74 percent thrust 
Maximum dynamic 
pressure (q) 
Throttle up to 
104 percent thrust 
Both SRMts chamber 
pressure at 50 psi 
End SRM action 
SRB separation command 
SRB physical 
separation 
Throttle down for 
3g acceleration 
3g acceleration 
MECO 
Engine Shutdown 
MECO 
ET separation 
Description 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
LH HPU system A start command 
LH HPU system B start command 
RH HPU system A start command 
RH HPU system B start command 
Engine 3 start command accepted 
Engine 2 start command accepted 
Engine 1 start command accepted 
SRB ignition command to SRB 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Derived ascent dynamic 
pressure 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Engine 3 command accepted 
RH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
LH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
RH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
LH SRM chamber pressure 
mid-range select 
SRB separation command flag 
LH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 
RH rate APU A turbine speed LOS 
Engine 3 command accepted 
Engine 2 command accepted 
Engine 1 command accepted 
Total load factor 
Command flag 
Engine 3 command accept 
Engine 2 command accept 
Engine 1 command accept 
Confirm flag 
ET separation command flag 
TABLE I.- STS-50 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Continued) 
Event 
OMS-1 ignition 
OMS-1 cutoff 
APU deactivation 
OMS-2 ignition 
OMS-2 cutoff 
Payload bay door open 
Flight control 
system checkout 
APU start 
APU stop 
First payload bay door 
close 
Second payload bay 
door open 
OMS-3 ignition 
OMS-3 cutoff 
Second payload bay 
door close 
APU activation 
for entry 
Deorbit maneuver 
ignition 
Deorbit maneuver 
cutoff 
Description 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
PLBD right open 1 
PLBD left open 1 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
PLBD right close 1 
PLBD left close 1 
Voice call 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
PLBD right close 1 
PLBD left close 1 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Left engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Right engine bi-prop valve 
position 
Actual time, 
G.M. t. 
Not performed - 
direct insertion 
trajectory flown 
177:16:27:10.77 
177:16:27:12.32 
177:16:27:13.27 
177:16:52:13.7 
177:16:52:13.8 
177:16:54:35.3 
177:16:54:35.6 
177:17:39:34 
177:17:40:54 
189:12:02:02.25 
189:12:09:11.58 
190:09:27:43 
190:09:29:22 
190:13:30:22 
190:15:09:22.0 
190:15:09:22.0 
190:15:09:52.8 
190:15:09:52.8 
191:08:02:46 
191:08:04:29 
191:10:36:44.20 
191:10:57:54.76 
191:10:57:56.42 
191:10:41:38.0 
191:10:41:38.1 
191:10:45:02.0 
191:10:45:01.9 
TABLE I.- STS-50 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Concluded) 
Event 
Entry interface 
(400K) 
Blackout ends 
Terminal area 
energy management 
Main landing gear 
contact 
Main landing gear 
weight on wheels 
Nose landing gear 
contact 
Nose landing gear 
weight on wheels 
Drag chute deployment 
Drag chute jettison 
Wheels stop 
APU deactivation 
Description 
Current orbital altitude 
above reference ellipsoid 
Data locked at high sample 
rate 
Major mode change (305) 
LH MLG tire pressure 
RH MLG tire pressure 
LH MLG weight on wheels 
RH MLG weight on wheels 
NLG tire pressure 
NLG WT on Wheels -1 
Drag chute deploy -1 cp volts 
Drag chute deploy -2 cp volts 
Drag chute jettison -1 cp volts 
Drag chute jettison -2 cp volts 
Velocity with respect to 
runway 
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 
Actual time, 
G.m. t. 
191:11:10:46 
No blackout 
191:11:36:00 
191:11:42:27 
191:11:42:27 
191:11:42:27 
191:11:42:27 
191:11:42:45 
191:11:42:45 
191:11:42:47.1 
191:11:42:47.2 
191:11:43:10.7 
191:11:43:10.8 
191:11:43:25 
191:11:46:04.88 
191:12:01:00.08 
191:12:01:02.91 
TABLE 11.- STS-50 PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
Number 
STS-50-V-01 
SPS-50-V-02 
STS-50-V-03 
STS-50-V-04 
STS-50-V-05 
STS-50-V-06 
STs-50-V-07 
STS-50-V-08 
- 
STS-50-V-09 
Title 
RCS Thruster LlU Heater 
Failed On 
RCRS Shutdown . 
CCIV Camera A Erratic 
TAGS Failure 
Oxygen Tank 2 Heater A2 
Erratic 
Right OMS TvC Yaw Hovement 
During Ascent 
Fuel Cell 3 Oxygen Purge 
Valve Leakage 
Oxygen Tank 2 Leak 
APU 3 Test Line 
Temperatures Out of 
Tolerance. . 
Ref erence 
177:21:32 G.m.t. 
00:07:29 MET 
IMSORPOl 
PR-LPO5-0056 
178:20:26 6.m.t. 
01:04:14 MET 
IMSORPO2 
PR-ECL-2-13-0824 
178:04:03 G.m.t. 
00:17:51 MET 
179:21:44 G.m.t. 
02:05:32 MET 
178:05:42 G.m.t. 
00:13:30 MET 
IPR 52V-0005 
IMSORP18 
177:16:20 G.m.t. 
00:00:08 MET 
IMSORP03 
PR-~~05-2-02-0047 
181:11:43 G.n.t. 
03:19:31 MET 
IM50RP04 
PR PCP-2-13-0249 
178:00:02 G.m.t. 
00:07:50 MET 
IPR 52V-0006 
IHSORP17 and 08 
PR F-2-13-0249 
178:13:57 G.n.t. 
00:21:44 MET 
M SOW05 
IPR 52V-0003 
Comments 
The RCS F4R thruster heater failed to turn off during the first cycle. 
m u a l  control of the heater was performed until temperature leveled 
out due to heater degradation. 
KSC: Remove thruster LlU for repair. (No 0% pod removal required.) 
Install spare thruster. 
The RCRS failed off several times while operating on both controller 1 
and controller 2. Repaired by an IPPI. 
KSC: Change out both actuators. 
CCIV camera A video downlink contained numerous lines of noise. The 
problem was intermittent. 
KSC: Removal and replacement of camera to be scheduled. 
The T M X  jammed during an uplink. Attempts to clear were unsuccessful. 
suspect failed developer motor. 
KSC: Remove TAGS unit and ship to JSC for troubleshooting and repair. 
Oxygen tank 2 heater A2 indicator (V45X1211E) not on when heaters 
commanded on. Inconclusive if heater is working or not. Suspect 
problem in cryogenic control box. 
KSC: Perform checkout of control box. 
Right yaw actuator drifted from -6.060 O to -5.815 O (-0.245 O) during 
ascent. File IX limit is f 0.20 O. First flight of this actuator. No 
flight impact for nominal burns 
KSC: ~emove and replace actuator. 
When fuel cell 3 purge was terminated, the oxygen flow only dropped 
from 7.2 to 6.5 lb/hr. Purge valve was cycled manually and apparently 
sealed. Suspect contamination or corrosion on valve seat. 
KSC: Remove and replace fuel cell 3. 
The oxygen tank 2 pressure dropped at a rate of approximately 
0.9 lb/hr throughout the mission. rXIring KSC troubleshooting, a leak 
was found at the quick disconnect poppet and at the flight cap. 
KSC: Remove and replace the quick disconnect. 
The T1 and T2 temperatures both went below the caution and the warning 
limit of 48 OF. The lower CCW limit was changed by uplink to 45 OF. 
T2 also goes above the upper limit of 100.0 OF. Uplinked change to 
120 OF. 
KSC: Evaluate heater wrap and thermostat installation. 
TABLE 11 .- STS-50 PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
- 
Comments 
At approximately 179:21:59 G.m.t., the circulation pump 2 pressure 
transducer went to 0 psia indicated. The main pump filter module 
transducer continued to read approximately 200 psia indicating normal 
circulation pump performance. The vehicle went LOS during this 
operation. While IDS, the crew got an FDA alarm and turned off the 
circulation pump. At 179:22:09:55 G.m.t., the circulation pump 2 
pressure transducer returned to a normal reading of 50 psia. Behavior 
repeated during other operations of the circulation pump. Suspect 
either transducer or instrumentation . 
NC: Remove and replace sensor. 
At 181:14:00 G.m.t., C C N  camera D showed a temperature of -9 OC. 
bring subsequent operations, the temperature dropped to -13 OC. 
Heaters in the camera should maintain the temperature above 0 OC. The 
camera temperature was controlled by powering the camera on 
periodically. 
KSc: Troubleshooting completed and camera removal and replacement to 
be scheduled. Troubleshooting verified power to the connector. 
Oxygen tank 7 heater control pressure began reflecting oxygen manifold 
pressures. The heaters on tank 7 were off, and oxygen was being 
supplied from tank 8 and 9. This situation is indicative of a stuck 
check valve in oxygen tank 7. The valve unstuck on flight day 14. 
KSC: Probable removal and replacement after EM) pallet removal. 
The crew reported that one of the Mark I1 camcorders onbaard failed. 
The camcorder would not image and a blank screen would appear; however, 
it would still function as a VCR. 
The bulkhead fuel high point bleed line temperature (V43T6234A) 
operated outside of its setpoint range while on the A heater and was 
possibly being controlled by the overtemperature thermostat. Also, 
The aft fuel high point bleed line temperature (V43T6238A) was cycling 
high on A heater. The A heater upper limit is higher than normal. 
KSC: Troubleshooting heater wrap and themstat installation. 
bring the fifth recharge of the bootstrap accumulator by circulation 
pump 2 at 188:15:44 G.m.t., it was noted that bootstrap accumulator 
pressure (V58P0267A) peaked at only 2356 psia , but reservoir pressure 
(V58P0231A) was 75 psia. The two signatures are indicative of an 
external accumulator gaseous nitrogen leak. 
NC: Remove and replace accumulator. 
Number 
STS-50-V-10 
STS-50-V-11 
STS-50-V-12 
STS-50-V-13 
STS-50-V-14 
sTS-50-V-15 
- 
Title 
Circulation Pump 2 Sensor 
Dropout 
C C N  Camera D Heater 
Failed Off 
Oxygen Tank 7 Check Valve 
Stuck Open 
Camcorder Hark I1 Failed 
OHS Fuel High Point Bleed 
Temperature High On A 
Heaters (Bulkhead Fuel 
V43T6234A) 
~ydraulic System 2 
Accumulator Nitrogen Leak 
Reference 
179:21:59 G.m.t. 
02:05:47 MET 
IPR 52V-0015 
IM 50RF09 
181:14:00 G.n.t. 
03:21:48 rn 
IPR 52-0024 
186:02:00 G.m.t. 
08:15:03 la 
M 50RP06 
PR EDO-1-2-0003 
187:22:00 G.m.t. 
10:05:48 MET 
177:23:45 G.m.t. 
00:07:30 MET 
IPR 52V-0009 
y! 50RP07 
189:15:44 G.m.t. 
IM SOW10 
IPR 52V-0012 
PR-HPD-2-13-0543 
TABLE 11.- STS-50 PROBLEM TRACKING LfST 
t?uuhr 
STS-50-V-16 
STS-50-V-17 
STS-50-V-18 
STS-50-V-19 
STS-50-V-20 
STS-50-V-21 
- 
Reference 
189:18:00 G a t .  
12:01:30 MET 
PR-ECL-2-13-0625 
189:22:37 G.m.t. 
12:06:25 MET 
190:07:50 G.m.t. 
12:15:38 MET 
PR-PRC2-13-0326 
IM5ORPl1 
190:15:09 G.m.t. 
12:22:57 MET 
189:17:35 G.m.t. 
12:01:23 MET 
IPR 5271-0023 
M 50RP19 
191:07:52 G a t .  
13:15:40 MET 
IJ450RP12 
IPR 52-0036 
T i t l e  
Waste Water Dump Degraded 
CCTV Camera C Failed 
RCS thrus te r  F2P Failed 
Off 
Right OMS Puel Quantity 
Bias High 
Oxygen Tank 3 Quantity 
Transducer Er ra t ic  
Starboard Forward Payload 
Bay Door Light Failed Off 
Conrments 
A t  189:17:51 G.a. t . ,  a waste water dump was i n i t i a t e d .  The dump r a t e  
s t a r t e d  a t  2.1 percent/minute and decreased t o  0.7 percent/minute. The 
crew was t o l d  t o  terminate the  dump when EECOM observed t h e  decreased 
dump rate .  The dunp was terminated a t  12:01:29 MET with the  f i n a l  dump 
r a t e  of 0.42 percent/lainute. A blockage of t h e  waste water dump l i n e  
is highly l ikely.  Waste water l iqu id  pressure readings a f t e r  dump 
valve closure suggest t h a t  the  blockage may be located i n  the  dump l i n e  
f i l t e r  which is upstream of the contingency water c ross t ie .  Therefore, 
an IFP( t h a t  purges t h e  l i n e  with a i r  o r  water would not  c l e a r  t h e  
blockage. 
MC: Troubleshooting t o  be scheduled. 
During an attempt t o  use camera C f o r  downlink video, no video was 
received. Possible cause was a stuck i r i s .  
MC: No act ion required. 
During the  nominal end-of-mission RCS t h r u s t e r  hot f i r e  procedure, RH 
declared th rus te r  P2F f a i l e d  of f ,  and t h e  t h r u s t e r  was auto-deselected. 
Oxidizer and fue l  i n j e c t o r  temperatures appeared nominal. However, t h e  
analog chamber pressure never exceeded 6 p s i a ,  indicat ing e i t h e r  low 
performance o r  a sensor problem. 
MC: FRCS removal f o r  th rus te r  removal and replacement t o  be 
scheduled. 
During the  o r b i t  adjust  maneuver, the  ROHS f u e l  t o t a l  quant i ty  gage 
(V43~5331~)  value increased approximately 6 percent. This gauge 
counted down properly f o r  the f i r s t  14 seconds of t h e  maneuver and then 
jumped t o  a reading of 50.4 percent. IFA/PR t o  be upgraded f o r  
defe r ra l  t o  OWP/opportunity fo r  adjustment/repair. 
At 189:17:35 G.a . t . ,  cryogenic oxygen tank 3 quanti ty  measurement 
V4SQ1305A s t a r t e d  s h i f t i n g  e r r a t i c a l l y  from 80 percent t o  off-scale 
high. The reading s t a b i l i z e d  back t o  the  normal quant i ty .  
After payload bay door (PLB) door closing, t h e  crew reported t h a t  the  
forward starboard f loodl ight  f l ickered,  but d i d  not come on. 
KSC: Troubleshooting t o  be scheduled. 
TABLE 11.- STS-50 PROBLEM TRACKING LIST 
Commsnts 
APU 1 gearbox nitrogen pressure decreased to the repressure value. 
After the gearbox was repressurized to 20 psia, the gearbox nitrogen 
pressure transducer (V46P0151A) cycled erratically during entry and 
postlanding. During entry, the gearbox nitrogen pressure transducer 
cycled below the repressurization value at least six times, and the 
gearbox nitrogen tank pressure (V46POl52A) continued to decrease until 
APU shutdown. 
KSC: Troubleshooting in progress. 
At OHE deorbit burn ignition, the MRDS PDn 1 got a MUX bite status 
failed. 
KSC: Remove and replace PCW. 
When the OEX was commanded to a mark, it skipped the mark and continued 
to the end of the tape. When commanded back to the mark, the tape 
stopped at the mark. A label command was then sent with no result. 
After sending an all-stop command and another label, the recorder began 
working properly. 
S C :  Troubleshooting to be scheduled. 
During a long run of circulation pump 2 to recharge the accumulator, 
intersystem leakage from system 2 into system 2 and 3 was observed. 
Circulation pump 3 was later run to return some of the fluid to system 
1 and 2. 
KSC: No activity required. 
Brake pressure did not respond for 8 to 9 seconds following braking 
initiation, then lagged for remainder of the braking phase. 
KSC: Troubleshooting is in progress. 
The "dogbone" seal on the left PLBD near panel 1 was protruding. 
At approximately Mach 1s during entry, the Orbiter aileron trim started 
a slow ramp from 0.0 percent deflection to a maximum of 2.2 percent 
deflection at Mach 10.1. This large trim value appeared to be a 
function of the "more up" aileron deflection associated with flying the 
fixed forward aileron schedule that was selected for aero programmed 
test input (PTI) purposes. 
number 
STS-50-V-22 
STS-50-V-23 
STS-50-V-24 
STS-50-V-25 
sTS-50-V-26 
=s-50-V-27 
sTS-50-V-28 
- 
Title 
AF'U 1 Gearbox Nitrogen 
Pressure Lou During Entry 
HAaS F M  1 Hux Bite Status 
OEX System Control Hodule 
Anomaly 
Excessive temperature in 
System 2 and Hydraulic 
Intersystem Leakage 
Right outboard make 
Pressure Lag 
Protruding PLBD Dogbone 
Seal 
Excessive Aileron Trim 
bring Entry 
Reference 
191:11:29 G.m.t. 
13:19:29 XtX 
IPR SN-0010 
IH SOW13 
191:10:41 G.m.t. 
Il60W14 
IPR 52V-0027 
186:11:05 G.m.t. 
IH SOW15 
189:16:30 G.m.t. 
IH 40RP15 
Postlanding 
IPR 52V-0011 
Postlanding 
PR-S1'RUC-2-13-3652 
W O W 1 6  
191:11:30 G.m.t. 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
APU auxiliary power unit 
ARS atmospheric revitalization subsystem 
BFS backup flight system 
BITE built-in test equipment 
CCTV closed-circuit television 
CPCG Commercial Protein Crystal Growth 
C/W caution and warning 
AP differential pressure 
DSO detailed supplementary objective 
DTO development test objective 
e.d.t. eastern daylight time 
EMU extravehicular mobility unit 
ET External Tank 
EVA extravehicular activity 
FCS flight control system 
FDA fault detection and annunciation 
FES flash evaporator system 
G.m.t. Greenwich mean time 
GPC general purpose computer 
GSE ground support equipment 
HPOTP high pressure oxidizer turbopump 
HPFTP high pressure fuel turbopump 
IAPU improved auxiliary power unit 
IFM in-flight maintenance 
I ~ P  specific impulse 
JSC Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
LCC Launch Commit Criteria 
MADS modular auxiliary data system 
MCC Mission Control Center 
MECO main engine cutoff 
MER mission evaluation room 
MET mission elapsed time 
MPS main propulsion system 
MSFC George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
NPSP net positive suction pressure 
OMRSD 
OMS 
PAL 
PCS 
PRSD 
RCC 
RCS 
RSRM 
RTV 
S&A 
SRB 
SRSS 
SSME 
STS 
TAGS 
TPS 
W P I  
WCS 
WSB 
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications 
Do cumen t 
orbital maneuvering subsystem 
protuberance air load 
pressure control system 
power reactant storage and distribution subystem 
reinforced carbon carbon 
reaction control subsystem 
redesigned solid, rocket motor 
room temperature vulcanizing 
safe and arm 
Solid Rocket Booster 
Shuttle Range Safety System 
Space Shuttle main engine 
Space Transportation System 
text and graphics system 
thermal protection system/subsystem 
Ultraviolet Plume Instrument 
waste collection system 
water spray boiler 
NASA Headquarters 
pP/B. Greenly QG. Perry - 
qP/n. Greenfield 
KP/D. Hedin 
m/c. Perry 
Goddard Space F l t  Ctr 
300/R. C. Batman 
700n .  E. Huber 
710//W. H q e r  
730/E. I. Powers 
730.1/5. P. Young 
4OO/V. Weyers 
100/P. T. Burr 
302/W. I. Bangs 
313/R. Har r io t t  
130/J. Katz 
NC 
-
Library-D (20 copies)  
m. H. Shau 
IEa-42Op. I. Hol l i s  
E E ~ ~ D .  Hoag (5 )  
FA51/S. P. Sauchier 
JMl/J.  A. Downey 
SAl2/O. E. Henson 
Iangley Research Center 
Technical Library/ I 
Hail Stop 185 
Rockwll-Houston 
MU-130/J. C. Snowden 
MU-l3O/J. P. Shea 
ZcOl/C. R i t r i v i  
M7E/J. Woodard 
R20B/R. Pechacek 
M~HF. n.  ahm man 
ZcOl/J .  Woodall 
ZCOlfl. Sco t t  
JSC 
-m. Cohen 
AC/D. A. Nebrig 
kCf/J. w. Young 
AP3/J. E. Riley (4 )  
AP4/B. L. b a n  ( 3 )  
w. L. Draper 
BY4flisto1-y Of f i ce  (2 )  
v. R. Puddy 
CA4/R. F i l l e r  
NSTS-08277 - STS-50 Space Shut t le  Hi 
u\4/J. Williams ES/J. A. Smith 
CB/D. Brandenstein (10) ES3P. C. drang 
CB/IC. Colgan ES:/P. Serna 
CB/T. Henricks ES6/C. W. Norris (2) 
m b r a r y  ET/C. A. ~ r a v e s ,  JC. (8) 
DA15/D. Nelson m 3 n .  ~ a r r e l l  
W/S .  G. Bales EWDSD Library 
W / R .  K. Holkan W/J. W. Say1 (2) 
OMD. Loglec w. W. Holloway 
M8/Libcary GM,/D. C. Schultr  
DF/J. Knight JL4/R. L. Squires 
DF~/P.  Cerna StQ/Library (3 )  
DP72/Q. Carelock KTn. R. Loo (2)  
DG/J. A. Wegmer HA/C. S. Harlan 
M I D .  Rickerl  ND/n. C. Perry 
M4/Lead FA0 tlD3fi. Uwallen 
M411/E. B. Pipport Ns/D. W. M i t t l a  
M/J. F. Whitely P+. L. Barry 
M45/n. LeBlmc PWJ. R. Garran 
M6/J. L. Clemnt  PT3/S. M r r i s  
DG47/Sim Sup's W C .  L. Huntoon 
DG66/H. Iampszzi m. D. Womck 
DG67/c. I6.Q SD/S. L. Pool 
WJ. C. Harpold SD2P. D. B i l l i c a  
W C .  F. Dd tec ich  SD24/D. A. Rushing 
Cn22/J. R. nontalbano S M p .  Cintron 
W2/W. H o l l i s t e r  SDS/J. Charles 
w. 0. Pohl SE/J. 8. tangford 
ECFJ. E. E l l i s  SNlS/D. P i t t s  
ECn. 8. Samnski SP/C. D. Perner (5) 
EC3/D. r. Hughes TWC. H. La.b.rt 
EC2pl. Rodriguez TC3/J. Low 
EC4/L. 0. Casey K 3 n .  Bruce 
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